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LAWYERING DECISIONS—OCTOBER 2009 TERM 
Eileen Kaufman* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Many Supreme Court observers have commented on the un-
usual number of cases decided last Term that involved some aspect of 
lawyering.1  In fact, one commentator described the phenomenon as 
“ ‘nothing short of a revolution.’ ”2  Whether it qualifies as a revolu-
tion or not, it is certainly notable that the Supreme Court’s “incredi-
ble shrinking docket” included as many cases as it did that directly 
impacted the practice of law.  These lawyering cases fall roughly into 
four categories: bad lawyering cases, First Amendment cases, attor-
ney’s fees cases, and timing cases.  This discussion focuses on the 
civil cases in these categories. 
II. BAD LAWYERING CASES 
The focus of this first category is Jerman v. Carlisle, McNel-
lie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA.3  The issue in this case was whether 
the bona fide error defense to civil liability under the Fair Debt Col-
lection Practices Act4 (“FDCPA”) applied to good faith mistakes of 
* Professor of Law, Touro Law Center. LL.M. and J.D., New York University School of 
Law; B.A., Skidmore College.  This Article is based on a presentation given at the Twenty-
Second Annual Leon D. Lazer Supreme Court Review Program held in Central Islip, New 
York on November 5, 2010. 
1 See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, Lawyering Suits Pile up at High Court, NAT’L L.J., July 6, 2010, 
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/scm/PubArticleSCM.jsp?id=1202463292471 
(characterizing the sixteen lawyering cases—“nearly [twenty] percent of the Court’s decision 
docket”—as “an unusually large number”). 
2 Id. (quoting Professor Renee Knake of Michigan State University College of Law). 
3 130 S. Ct. 1605 (2010).  It is not entirely fair to categorize this as a case of “bad 
lawyering.”  Rather, the case involved a good faith but ultimately incorrect interpretation of 
the law.  See id. at 1610. 
4 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1692-1692p (2010). 
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law.5  The law firm, Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA 
(“Carlisle”), sought foreclosure of a mortgage and sent a complaint to 
the homeowner with a notice telling the homeowner that she had to 
dispute the debt in writing within thirty days or the debt would be as-
sumed.6  The debt had already been paid in full, however, and Car-
lisle withdrew the foreclosure action.7  The homeowner then brought 
an action against Carlisle alleging that the practice of requiring a deb-
tor to dispute the debt in writing was itself a violation of the 
FDCPA.8 
The trial court agreed that Carlisle had violated the statute by 
requiring the debtor to dispute the debt in writing, although it ac-
knowledged that there was a conflict of authority on that question.9  
Therefore, the issue became whether or not Carlisle was protected 
from liability by the bona fide error defense.10  The Supreme Court 
held that the defense does not apply to a misinterpretation of the 
law—not even a good faith, reasonable misinterpretation of the law.11  
Therefore, lawyers are subject to liability for violations of the Act, 
even when they are acting upon a misreading of the requirements of 
the Act. 
What makes the case so important is the effect that it will 
have on debt-collecting lawyers.  The decision puts lawyers in a dif-
ficult situation because the threat of personal liability could interfere 
with the lawyer’s obligation to zealously advocate on behalf of the 
client.  For example, an attorney may be faced with a situation where 
there is ambiguity as to the Act’s meaning.  One way to interpret the 
ambiguity benefits the client, but if the attorney chooses that interpre-
5 Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1608 (“This case presents the question whether the ‘bona fide 
error’ defense . . . applies to a violation resulting from a debt collector’s mistaken 
interpretation of the legal requirements of the FDCPA.”). 
6 Id. at 1609. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 1609-10 (“While acknowledging a division of authority on the question, the 
[d]istrict [c]ourt held that Carlisle had violated § 1692(g) by requiring Jerman to dispute the 
debt in writing.”). 
10 Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1610.  The district court found that the bona fide error defense 
shielded Carlisle from liability and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.  Id.  Recognizing the existence 
of a circuit split on this issue, the Supreme Court “granted certiorari to resolve the conflict of 
authority as to the scope of the FDCPA’s bona fide error defense.”  Id. 
11 Id. at 1611 (“We have long recognized the ‘common maxim, familiar to all minds, that 
ignorance of the law will not excuse any person, either civilly or criminally.’ ” (quoting 
Barlow v. United States, 32 U.S. 404, 411 (1833))). 
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tation and is wrong, then the attorney faces personal liability.  This 
creates a conflict of interest between the attorney’s personal financial 
liability and the attorney’s ethical obligation to zealously advocate on 
behalf of the client. 
That is the concern of the two dissenting justices in the case—
Justices Kennedy and Alito—who said: 
When statutory provisions have not yet been inter-
preted in a definitive way, principled advocacy is to be 
prized, not punished. 
An attorney’s obligation in the face of uncer-
tainty is to give the client his or her best professional 
assessment of the law’s mandate. 
. . . . 
. . . Henceforth, creditors’ attorneys of the highest eth-
ical standing are encouraged to adopt a debtor-friendly 
interpretation of every question, lest the attorneys 
themselves incur personal financial risk.12 
One way out of that dilemma was suggested by Justice Breyer 
in a concurring opinion.13  Attorneys who seek an advisory opinion 
from the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and follow the opinion 
are insulated, by statute, from liability.14  The dissenting justices, 
however, believed that was an impractical solution to a serious prob-
lem of professional ethics.15 
III. FIRST AMENDMENT CASES 
A. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project 
The second category concerns First Amendment cases that 
have a direct impact on the actual practice of law.  One of the most 
closely watched cases of the Term, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Pro-
12 Id. at 1634 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
13 See id. at 1625 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
14 Id.  
15 Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1635 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[Justice Breyer’s] argument 
misconceives the practical realities of litigation.  Filings and motions are made under 
pressing time constraints; arguments must be offered quickly in reply; and strategic decisions 
must be taken in the face of incomplete information.  Lawyers in practice would not consider 
this alternative at all realistic, particularly where the defense is needed most.”). 
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ject16 was the first post-September 11th case to address First 
Amendment rights in the context of national security.  At issue in 
Holder was the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996,17 which prohibits providing “material support or resources” to 
foreign organizations designated as terrorist organizations.18  Accord-
ing to the statute, “material support” includes financial services, 
training, and expert advice or assistance.19  But does the statute apply 
to attorneys who are looking to support the legal, non-violent work of 
these organizations? 
Ralph Fertig, one of the named plaintiffs in the case, spent his 
early years participating in the civil rights movement.20  Fifty years 
later, as president of the Humanitarian Law Project, he wanted to ad-
vocate for what he perceived to be another oppressed minority, the 
Kurds in Turkey.  More specifically, the Humanitarian Law Project 
wanted to support the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (“PKK”)21 by train-
ing members of the organization to use humanitarian and internation-
al law to resolve disputes.22  The proposed support would also in-
clude teaching PKK members how to petition bodies, like the United 
Nations, for relief.23  The Court ruled against Humanitarian Law 
Project, six-to-three,24 rejecting Fertig’s argument that the application 
of the material support statute to those activities violates the First 
16 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). 
17 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 
1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, and 42 U.S.C.A.). 
18 Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2712-13 (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a)(1) (West 2010)). 
19 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339A(b)(1) (West 2010) (defining the term “material support or 
resources”). 
20 Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2714.  Fertig is a seventy-nine-year-old lawyer, a retired federal 
administrative law judge, a professor at the University of Southern California, and the 
President of a human rights organization called the Humanitarian Law Project.  See Adam 
Liptak, Right to Free Speech Collides with Fight Against Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2010, 
at A18.  In his earlier days, he participated in the civil rights movement, joined the Freedom 
Rides, and was arrested and beaten in a Selma, Alabama jail.  See id. 
21 The PKK was one of thirty groups designated by the Secretary of State as a foreign 
terrorist organization.  See Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg. 
52,650-01 (Oct. 8, 1997). 
22 Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2716. 
23 Id. (noting that plaintiffs challenged the statute’s validity on the basis that it prohibited 
them from engaging in certain specified activities, including training PKK members to use 
international law to resolve disputes peacefully; teaching PKK members to petition the 
United Nations and other representative bodies for relief). 
24 See id. at 2712. 
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Amendment.25  Fertig risks fifteen years in prison if he engages in the 
activities that he proposed.26 
This decision will profoundly affect lawyers involved in this 
type of work.  Some have said it puts international peace organiza-
tions “in a very odd situation.”27  Former President Jimmy Carter said 
the ruling “inhibits the work of human rights and conflict resolution 
groups” whose work requires them to “interact directly with groups 
that have engaged in violence.”28  In fact, some have speculated that 
lawyers, including President Carter, could be prosecuted for training 
parties like Hezbollah or Hamas in Lebanon or Gaza in fair election 
practices.29  Others have said that organizations like Catholic Relief 
Services could be prosecuted for conducting programs that “teach ter-
rorist organizations how to demobilize their weapons, enter into an 
electoral process, or engage antagonistic religious groups in discus-
sion.”30 
Is filing an amicus brief on behalf of a terrorist organization a 
violation of the statute that can subject a lawyer to criminal prosecu-
tion?  At oral argument, former Solicitor General Elena Kagan ar-
gued that doing so would violate the statute.31  Whether she is right is 
unclear from reading the decision, but it would likely be covered by 
the Act, at least if it was coordinated in some way with the organiza-
tion.  The Act would certainly be violated if an amicus brief was filed 
25 See id. at 2725-26, 2730-31 (recognizing Congress’s national security concerns in 
passing the statute and holding that the statute does not violate freedom of speech and 
freedom of association). 
26 Id. at 2713 n.1.  After the decision was announced, Fertig said that his organization will 
“continue its peaceful advocacy work, ‘but [it] do[es] so with great fear.’ ”  Tony Mauro, 
‘Material Support’ Ruling May Break 1st Amendment Ground, THE FIRST AMENDMENT CTR. 
(June 22, 2010), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id=23079. 
27 George A. Lopez, a professor at the University of Notre Dame’s Krok Institute for 
International Peace Studies, said: “ ‘We’re allowed to work with the Colombian bishops, but 
we’re not allowed to work with them in the same room when they are working’ (with groups 
on the terrorist list).”  Adeshina Emmanuel, Supreme Court Ruling Could Obstruct Peace 
Work, AMERICANCATHOLIC.ORG (July 20, 2010), http://www.americancatholic.org/news/ 
report. aspx?id=2867. 
28 Supreme Court Rules “Material Support” Law Can Stand, ACLU (June 21, 2010), 
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/supreme-court-rules-material-support-law-can-stand. 
29 See, e.g., Mauro, supra note 26 (speculating that former President Carter could be 
prosecuted for meeting with Hamas and Hezbollah to encourage fair elections). 
30 See Current Comment, AMERICA, July 19, 2010, available at http://www.america 
magazine.org/content/article.cfm?article_id=12387. 
31 Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2719 (noting the Government’s statement that the statute “would 
bar filing an amicus brief in support of a foreign terrorist organization”). 
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at the direction of the organization. 
Although the Court took pains to distinguish providing ma-
terial support, which is prohibited by the Act, from what it called “in-
dependent advocacy,” which is not, the dividing line remains un-
clear.32 
B. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States 
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States33 chal-
lenged two provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Con-
sumer Protection Act34 as applied to lawyers.35  The threshold issue 
for the Court was whether the Act applied to lawyers. 36  This ques-
tion was dependent on whether lawyers constitute “debt relief agen-
cies.”37  Justice Sotomayor, writing for a unanimous court, had little 
difficulty concluding that attorneys do qualify as “debt relief agen-
cies” based on a plain reading of the text.38 
This conclusion leads to the two First Amendment issues in 
the case.  The first was whether a provision of the Act, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 526, which prohibits attorneys from advising clients to incur more 
debt, violates the First Amendment.39  The answer depends on how 
narrowly or broadly the statute is interpreted.  The Court upheld the 
provision by adopting a narrow reading, construing the statute to pro-
hibit only advice to a debtor to incur more debt, because the debtor is 
filing for bankruptcy rather than for another valid purpose.40  In other 
words, the statute precludes advising a debtor to load up on debt be-
cause the debt would be discharged in bankruptcy, but it does not 
prohibit other advice.  For example, an attorney can advise a debtor 
to “refinance a mortgage or purchase a reliable car prior to filing be-
cause doing so will reduce the debtor’s interest rates or improve [the 
32 Id. at 2721-22. 
33 130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010). 
34 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 12, 18 and 28 U.S.C.A.). 
35 Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1330-31. 
36 Id. at 1331 (stating that certiorari was granted to determine the scope of the statute). 
37 Id. (“We first consider whether the term ‘debt relief agency’ includes attorneys.”). 
38 Id. at 1333. 
39 Id. at 1329. 
40 Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1336 (concluding that advising a client to “load up” on debt is 
prohibited “conduct that is abusive per se”). 
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client’s] ability to repay.”41  That advice is not prohibited by the Act 
because “the promise of enhanced financial prospects, rather than the 
anticipated filing, is the impelling cause.”42  Other permissible advice 
includes advising the debtor “to incur additional debt to buy groce-
ries, pay medical bills, or make other purchases ‘reasonably neces-
sary for [his or her] support or maintenance.’ ”43 
Also, the prohibition does not prevent a lawyer from discuss-
ing the issue of incurring more debt with his or her client.44  This, the 
Court concludes, is consistent with ABA Model Rule of Professional 
Conduct 1.2, which distinguishes between lawyers counseling a client 
to engage in criminal or fraudulent conduct and simply discussing the 
legal consequences of engaging in a particular act.45 
The second provision of the Act that was challenged was the 
disclosure requirement.46  Section 528 requires attorney advertise-
ments to state that the advertiser is a debt relief agency and that the 
services being offered may include bankruptcy.47  Whether or not 
that disclosure requirement is constitutional depends on how the 
speech is characterized.  Normally, restrictions on commercial speech 
are evaluated pursuant to an intermediate scrutiny test.48  But that test 
only applies if the regulated speech is not misleading and does not 
advocate unlawful conduct.49  Here, the Court concluded that because 
the statute is directed at misleading speech, and because it is a disclo-
sure requirement rather than a limitation on speech, the governing 
41 Id. at 1339 n.6. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2)(C)(ii)(II) (West 2010)). 
44 Id. at 1338. 
45 Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1338.  “Against this backdrop, it is hard to see how a rule that 
narrowly prohibits an attorney from affirmatively advising a client to commit this type of 
abusive prefiling conduct could chill attorney speech or inhibit the attorney-client 
relationship.”  Id. 
46 Id. at 1339. 
47 11 U.S.C.A. § 528 (West 2010).  Subsection (b) governs “advertisement[s] of 
bankruptcy assistance services.”  Id. 
48 See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995) (stating that “[the 
Court] engages in ‘intermediate’ scrutiny of restrictions on commercial speech”); Cent. 
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (stating 
that restrictions on non-misleading commercial speech regarding lawful activity must 
“directly advanc[e]’ a substantial governmental interest and be ‘n[o] more extensive than is 
necessary to serve that interest”). 
49 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566 n.9. 
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test is mere rational basis revi
The Court analogized the issue to that in Zauderer v. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio,51 where the 
Court upheld a professional responsibility rule that requires lawyers 
who advertise contingency fee services to disclose that a losing client 
could be responsible for litigation costs and fees.52  Using parallel ra-
tionale, the Court reasoned in Milavetz that the disclosure require-
ments were simply aimed at combating inherently misleading com-
mercial advertisements.53  Applying the rational basis test, the Court 
easily concluded that the challenged disclosure requirements were 
reasonably related to the government’s interest in preventing decep-
tion of consumers.54 
Interestingly, Justice Scalia wrote separately to voice his dis-
agreement with footnote three of the majority opinion, which cited to 
legislative history consisting of a report of the House Committee on 
the Judiciary.55  The report was cited to support the majority’s con-
clusion that the Act’s purpose was to address abusive practices of 
lawyers and other bankruptcy professionals.56  Justice Scalia refused 
to indulge “the extravagant assumption that Members of the House 
other than members of its Committee on the Judiciary read the Report 
(and the further extravagant assumption that they agreed with it.)”57  
And as for the President, he “surely had more important things to 
50 Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1339-40 (stating that “[u]njustified or unduly burdensome 
disclosure requirements offend the First Amendment by chilling protected speech, but ‘an 
advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are 
reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers’ ” (emphasis 
added) (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 
626, 651 (1985))). 
51 471 U.S. 626. 
52 Id. at 651. 
53 Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1344. 
54 Id. at 1341.  The Court also distinguished the case from In re R.M.J.  See id. at 1344.  
That case concerned ethical rules prohibiting lawyers from advertising their practice areas in 
any other terms than those prescribed by the state supreme court and from advertising the 
courts in which they were admitted to practice.  In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 193 (1982).  
Intermediate scrutiny was applied to strike down the rules at issue in In re R.M.J. because 
the restricted statements were not inherently misleading.  See id. at 205-06. 
55 Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1332 n.3. 
56 Id. (“Statements in a Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary regarding the 
Act’s purpose indicate concern with abusive practices undertaken by attorneys as well as 
other bankruptcy professionals.”). 
57 Id. at 1342 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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do.”58  Justice Scalia chastised the Court for relying on legislative 
history to support a completely unambiguous statute, a practice he 
feared conscientious lawyers may mimic and repeat.59 
Justice Thomas also wrote separately to express his view that 
the test for evaluating commercial speech should not turn on whether 
the regulation compels speech or restricts speech.60  Thus, Justice 
Thomas calls for a reexamination of Zauderer to determine whether it 
provides sufficient protection against government mandated disclo-
sures of commercial speech.61 
The Second Circuit decided a similar case several months af-
ter Milavetz.  In Connecticut Bar Association v. United States,62 the 
Second Circuit held that attorneys are subject to other disclosure re-
quirements contained in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Con-
sumer Protection Act, in addition to those upheld in Milavetz.63  The 
additional disclosure requirements mandate that attorneys provide 
certain notices and disclosures about bankruptcy64 and require a writ-
ten contract that clearly explains the services the attorney would pro-
vide, as well as the fees.65 
IV. ATTORNEY’S FEES CASES 
There were three pertinent attorney’s fees cases this past 
Term, each arising under a different fee-shifting statute: the Equal 
Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), the Employee Retirement Security 
Act (“ERISA”), and the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act.66  
This discussion focuses on the cases concerning the first two statutes, 
58 Id. 
59 Id. (“Our cases have said that legislative history is irrelevant when the statutory text is 
clear. . . . [footnote three] advises conscientious attorneys that this is not true, and that they 
must spend time and their clients’ treasure combing the annals of legislative history in all 
cases . . . .”). 
60 Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1343 (Thomas, J., concurring).   
61 Id. (“Accordingly, I would be willing to reexamine Zauderer and its progeny in an 
appropriate case to determine whether these precedents provide sufficient First Amendment 
protection against government-mandated disclosures.”). 
62 620 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2010). 
63 Id. at 95-96. 
64 Id. at 96. 
65 Id. at 100. 
66 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d) (West 2010); 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(g)(1) (West 2010); 42 
U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West 2010). 
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but Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn,67 which concerns 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988, is discussed elsewhere. 
A. Astrue v. Ratliff 
In Astrue v. Ratliff,68 the Court considered whether the fees 
awarded under EAJA are payable to the party-litigant or to the attor-
ney.69  This is significant because if the fees are payable to the party, 
then a pre-existing debt that the party owes to the government can be 
offset against the fee award.  Unfortunately for lawyers, the statute 
clearly states that the fees are payable to the party, and that is what a 
unanimous Supreme Court concluded.70 
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, 
authored a concurring opinion.71  They wrote separately to point out 
that offsetting the fee against pre-existing debts of the party undercuts 
the effectiveness of EAJA.72  The purpose of this fee-shifting statute 
is to enable individuals who have been wronged by the government 
to find a lawyer to challenge unreasonable governmental conduct.73  
It is designed, as its name suggests, to enhance access to justice by 
providing a mechanism for people of limited means to find a law-
yer.74  While the concurring justices agreed with the majority’s tex-
tual analysis,75 their concurrence is an explicit invitation to Congress 
to reconsider applying the offset rules to EAJA fee awards. 
But until Congress accepts that invitation, those most likely to 
be affected by this decision are lawyers who represent clients in so-
67 130 S. Ct. 1662 (2010). 
68 130 S. Ct. 2521 (2010). 
69 Id. at 2524 (“We consider whether an award of ‘fees and other expenses’ to a 
‘prevailing party’ under § 2412(d) is payable to the litigant or to his attorney.”). 
70 Id. (“We hold that a § 2412(d) fees award is payable to the litigants and is therefore 
subject to a Government offset to satisfy a pre-existing debt that the litigant owes the United 
States.”).  In this case, the attorney attempted to avoid this result by relying on the 
government’s longstanding practice of paying EAJA awards directly to the lawyer of a case.  
See id. at 2524-25.  However, that practice existed prior to 2005, at which time the Treasury 
Department decided that fees awarded under the EAJA are payable to the client, and subject 
to offset if the client owes money to the government.  See id.  Since then, the government 
only makes direct payment of fees to attorneys after checking that the party does not have 
any outstanding debts to the government.  Astrue, 130 S. Ct. at 2524-25. 
71 See id. at 2529-33 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
72 Id. at 2530 (opining that “such offsets undercut the effectiveness of the EAJA”). 
73 Id. 
74 See id. at 2531. 
75 Astrue, 130 S. Ct. at 2533 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
  
2011] LAWYERING DECISIONS 95 
 
cial security cases and veterans cases—including law school clinics, 
which often engage in this representation.  Twelve thousand civil ac-
tions are filed each year to challenge denials of social security bene-
fits, a figure that represents five percent of all civil filings in federal 
court.76  That figure does not include the number of veterans cases 
filed each year.  Clients who have been denied social security or vet-
erans benefits are often unable to afford private counsel, and the 
amount of money at issue is often too small for a contingency fee ar-
rangement.  The EAJA enables these individuals to find lawyers to 
challenge the government’s determination.  Astrue will remove the 
incentive for lawyers to take these cases because, even if successful, 
the fee may be completely swallowed up by the offset.  The attorney 
representing Ratliff observed that “these cases generally are handled 
by solo practitioners, and ‘far from getting rich handling them, the 
awards barely pay overhead, considering that EAJA rates are capped 
at what are typically below market rates.’ ”77 
Section 1988 uses comparable language to EAJA.78  If this re-
sult is applied to § 1988, it will significantly undercut the concept of 
the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act, which is intended to en-
able private lawyers to act as private attorney generals and make 
possible the vindication of important federal rights.79 
Another important aspect of this case relates to how often the 
government is wrong in social security and veterans cases.  At oral 
argument, the Court learned that the government’s position was 
found to be unjustified in seventy percent of veterans appeals and for-
ty-two percent of social security appeals.80  These statistics led Chief 
Justice Roberts to remark, “Well, that’s really startling, isn’t it?  In 
litigating with veterans, the government more often than not takes a 
position that is substantially unjustified?”81  Chief Justice Roberts 
was right to be startled.  But, perversely, by permitting the offset 
76 Brief for National Organization of Social Security Claimants’ Representatives et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 22, Astrue, 130 S. Ct. 2521 (No. 08-1322), 2010 
WL 197356. 
77 Marcia Coyle, High Court Lets Government Take Fee Awards for Clients’ Debts, 
NAT’L L.J., June 14, 2010, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id= 
1202462695027&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1. 
78 Compare 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d), with 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988(b). 
79 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988(a). 
80 Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, Astrue, 130 S. Ct. 2521 (No. 08-1322), 2010 WL 
603696. 
81 Id. at 52. 
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rules to be applied to EAJA fees, the Astrue decision makes it harder 
to challenge these erroneous and substantially unjustified determina-
tions. 
B. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company 
Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co.82 answered the 
question of whether the fees in an ERISA action are only payable to a 
prevailing party.83  Justice Thomas, writing for a unanimous court, 
rejected the view that only prevailing parties are eligible for fees, and 
instead held that a court has the discretion to award fees “as long as 
the fee claimant has achieved ‘some degree of success of the me-
rits.’ ”84  While this “case may not captivate the media and public[,] 
. . . plaintiffs file about 10,000 lawsuits for ERISA benefits annually 
and they are expensive cases to litigate,” thus, the decision has tre-
mendous significance.85 
Bridget Hardt worked for a textile manufacturer and applied 
for disability benefits when she developed carpal tunnel syndrome.86  
Reliance, the insurance company, administered the employer’s long-
term disability plan.87  Reliance initially denied Ms. Hardt’s claim,88 
but subsequently reversed itself and awarded temporary disability 
benefits for twenty-four months.89  Meanwhile, Ms. Hardt developed 
new symptoms and was diagnosed with small-fiber neuropathy.90  
She applied for and received social security disability benefits,91 but 
Ms. Hardt was unable to convince Reliance that she was totally dis-
abled and entitled to long-term disability benefits.  She sued Reliance 
under ERISA.92 
Both parties moved for summary judgment, and both motions 
82 130 S. Ct. 2149 (2010). 
83 Id. at 2152 (analyzing 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(g)(1), which governs fee-shifting in an 
ERISA action). 
84 Id. (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 694 (1983)). 
85 Marcia Coyle, High Court Faces Blockbuster Cases as Stevens’ Retirement Nears, 
NAT’L L.J., Apr. 26, 2010, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=120245 
3173828. 




90 Id. at 2153. 
91 Hardt, 130 S. Ct. at 2153. 
92 Id. 
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were denied by the district court.93  But, notably, the district court 
found “ ‘compelling evidence’ . . . that ‘Ms. Hardt [wa]s totally dis-
abled due to her neuropathy.’ ”94  The district court “was ‘inclined to 
rule in Ms. Hardt’s favor,’ ” but chose to give Reliance the opportuni-
ty “ ‘to address the deficiencies in its approach.’ ”95  The district 
court believed a remand was appropriate because “ ‘[t]his case 
presents one of those scenarios where the plan administrator has 
failed to comply with the ERISA guidelines,’ meaning ‘Ms. Hardt did 
not get the kind of review to which she was entitled under applicable 
law.’ ”96  Therefore, the court instructed Reliance to act on Ms. 
Hardt’s application within thirty days, “[o]therwise . . . judgment 
[would] be issued in favor of Ms. Hardt.”97  Reliance did as in-
structed and determined Ms. Hardt was eligible for long-term disabil-
ity benefits.98 
Ms. Hardt then sought and obtained attorney’s fees, but the 
Fourth Circuit reversed the fee award because Ms. Hardt was not a 
prevailing party.99  In reaching that result, the Fourth Circuit relied 
on the Supreme Court’s definition of prevailing party, “under which a 
fee claimant qualifies as a ‘prevailing party’ only if he has obtained 
an ‘enforceable judgmen[t] on the merits’ or a ‘court-ordered consent 
decre[e].’ ”100  The Fourth Circuit held that the district court’s re-
mand order did not qualify as an enforceable judgment on the merits 
because it “ ‘did not require Reliance to award benefits . . . .’ ”101  
Therefore, Ms. Hardt was not a prevailing party and was not eligible 
for fees.102 
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that unlike so many oth-
er fee-shifting statutes, the ERISA provision does not utilize the term 
“prevailing party,” and it is therefore error to restrict fees to those 
93 Id. at 2154 (“The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, both of which the 
[d]istrict [c]ourt denied.”). 
94 Id. (alteration in original). 
95 Id. (citations omitted). 
96 Hardt, 130 S. Ct. at 2154 (alteration in original). 
97 Id. (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 2155 (noting that the “[d]istrict [c]ourt granted Hardt’s motion . . . . and the 
[c]ourt of [a]ppeals vacated the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s order . . . . [because Ms. Hardt] failed to 
establish that she was a ‘prevailing party’ ”). 
100 Id. (alteration in original) (citing Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t 
of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001)). 
101 Hardt, 130 S. Ct. at 2155. 
102 Id. 
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who would qualify only as prevailing parties.103 
The Court then attempted to determine under what circums-
tances a party is entitled to fees.104  In answering that question, the 
Court rejected the five-factor test used by the district court and many 
circuit courts.105  Instead, the Supreme Court relied on cases that in-
terpreted other fee-shifting statutes, such as ERISA, that are not li-
mited to prevailing parties.106  The standard adopted by the Court re-
quired that the plaintiff “show ‘some degree of success on the merits’ 
before a court may award attorney’s fees.”107  This standard, howev-
er, cannot be met if the claimant only received some “ ‘trivial success 
on the merits’ or a ‘purely procedural victor[y].’ ”108  The claimant 
does satisfy the standard “if the court can fairly call the outcome of 
the litigation some success on the merits without conducting a ‘leng-
thy inquir[y] into the question whether a particular party’s success 
was ‘substantial’ or occurred on a ‘central issue.’ ”109 
In applying that standard to the facts here, the Court con-
cluded that the plaintiff was entitled to fees.110  After all, the plaintiff 
persuaded the district court that Reliance had failed to comply with 
103 Id.  The Court elaborated: 
Because Congress failed to include in § 1132(g)(1) an express ‘prevail-
ing party’ limit on the availability of attorney’s fees, the Court of Ap-
peals’ decision adding that term of art to a fee-shifting statute from 
which it is conspicuously absent more closely resembles ‘invent[ing] a 
statute rather than interpret[ing] one.’ 
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 359 (2005)). 
104 Id. at 2156. 
105 Hardt, 130 S. Ct. at 2158.  These five factors used by several district courts included: 
“(1) the degree of opposing parties’ culpability or bad faith; (2) ability of 
opposing parties to satisfy an award of attorneys’ fees; (3) whether an 
award of attorneys’ fees against the opposing parties would deter other 
persons acting under similar circumstances; (4) whether the parties re-
questing attorneys’ fees sought to benefit all participants and beneficia-
ries of an ERISA plan or to resolve a significant legal question regarding 
ERISA itself; and (5) the relative merits of the parties’ positions.” 
Id. at 2154 n.1 (quoting Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 987 F.2d 1017, 1029 (4th 
Cir. 1993)).  The Court, however, found that the five factors bore “no obvious relation” to 
the text of the statute and were therefore “not required for channeling a court’s discretion 
when awarding fees under this section.”  Id. at 2158. 
106 Id. at 2157.  The Court chose to rely upon Ruckelshaus in interpreting the meaning of 
§ 1132(g)(1).  Id. 
107 Hardt, 130 S. Ct. at 2158 (quoting Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 694). 
108 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 688 n.9). 
109 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 688 n.9). 
110 Id. at 2159. 
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ERISA.  Although the district court did not grant her motion for 
summary judgment, it nevertheless found compelling evidence that 
she was totally disabled and stated that it was inclined to rule in her 
favor,111 but would give Reliance another opportunity to get it right.  
This clearly amounted to success on the merits entitling her to attor-
ney’s fees.112 
This decision unquestionably makes it easier to obtain attor-
ney’s fees—at least in the First, Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, 
which have all required prevailing party status.113  Making it easier to 
obtain attorney’s fees is consistent with the twin goals of the ERISA 
fee shifting statute—discouraging frivolous claim denials and enabl-
ing claimants to secure legal representation, even when their claims 
are small.114 
The decision, however, leaves open several questions, includ-
ing: (1) whether a remand order without more constitutes some suc-
cess on the merits; (2) what actually constitutes “some degree of suc-
cess on the merits”; and (3) under what circumstances can the five-
part test actually be used?  The Court maintained that the five-part 
test is not required because it “bear[s] no obvious relation to [the sta-
tutory] text or to [the Court’s] fee-shifting jurisprudence.”115  But, in 
a pesky footnote, the Court said: “We do not foreclose the possibility 
that once a claimant has satisfied this requirement [of some degree of 
success on the merits], and thus becomes eligible for a fees award . . . 
a court may consider the five factors . . . in deciding whether to award 
attorney’s fees.”116  This statement muddies the waters.  The five-
factor test is not required, yet the possibility remains that a court can 
use the test in exercising its discretion to award fees under the Act.  It 
is fairly certain that there is going to be more litigation regarding this 
issue.  Many commentators have expressed concern that “after a sig-
111 Hardt v. Reliance Standard Ins. Co., 540 F. Supp. 2d 656, 664 (E.D. Va. 2008). 
112 See id. 
113 See, e.g., Tate v. Long Term Disability Plan for Salaried Emps. of Champion Int’l 
Corp., 545 F.3d 555, 564 (7th Cir. 2008); Graham v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 501 
F.3d 1153, 1162 (10th Cir. 2007); Martin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., Inc., 115 F.3d 
1201, 1210 (4th Cir. 1997); Cottrill v. Sparrow, Johnson & Ursillo, Inc., 100 F.3d 220, 226 
(1st Cir. 1996). 
114 The fee award in Hardt ($58,920) was larger than the benefits awarded ($55,250).  
Marcia Coyle, High Court Smooths Path to Plaintiff Fees in Disability Cases, LAW.COM 
(May 25, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1202458721510.  
115 Hardt, 130 S. Ct. at 2158. 
116 Id. at 2158 n.8 (emphasis added). 
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nificant battle over benefits, the new rule may result in a second 
round of litigation over attorney’s fees.”117 
V. CASES INVOLVING ISSUES OF TIMING 
A. Mohawk v. Carpenter 
The first case in this category was Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. 
Carpenter,118 a case that provided the occasion for Justice Soto-
mayor’s first decision—and a unanimous one.119  The question before 
the Court was whether a disclosure order adverse to the attorney-
client privilege is immediately appealable.120  The Court’s answer 
was a resounding no.121 
Norman Carpenter worked at a carpet mill and supervised ap-
proximately one hundred carpet factory workers.122  His path to the 
Supreme Court began after he sent a series of e-mails to the compa-
ny’s human resources department complaining that Mohawk, his em-
ployer, was hiring “undocumented immigrants.”123  Unbeknownst to 
Carpenter, Mohawk was already the defendant in a racketeering class 
action alleging that Mohawk knowingly hired undocumented workers 
in order to drive down the wages of its legal employees.124  Carpenter 
was then summoned to speak with Mohawk’s RICO lawyer.125  Car-
penter alleged that during this conversation, he was pressured to re-
117 See, e.g., Andrew O. Bunn & Stephanie J. Cohen, New Fee-Shifting Regime Under 
ERISA in Wake of “Hardt,” N.Y. L.J., July 22, 2010 (stating that there is a likely result of “a 
second round of litigation over attorney’s fees” because the some degree of success 
“standard is ambiguous and will require additional litigation to specify the point at which the 
degree of success is so insignificant that an award of attorney’s fees would be an abuse of 
discretion”). 
118 130 S. Ct. 599 (2009). 
119 See id. at 602. 
120 Id. at 603. 
121 See id. at 609 (holding that “the collateral order doctrine does not extend to disclosure 
orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege” because “[e]ffective appellate review can be 
had by other means”). 
122 Id. at 603. 
123 Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 603.  Justice Sotomayor’s use of the term “undocumented 
immigrants,” as opposed to “illegal aliens,” prompted considerable attention from the press 
due to the fact that this was the first time that the term appeared in a Supreme Court 
decision.  See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Sotomayor Draws Retort From a Fellow Justice, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2009, at A24. 
124 Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 603.  See also Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 314 F. Supp. 
2d 1333 (N.D. Ga. 2004). 
125 Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 603. 
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tract his charge, and as a result of his refusal to retract, he was 
fired.126  Carpenter then sued Mohawk, claiming that his firing was 
unlawful under both state and federal law.127 
In discovery, Carpenter sought information about his firing, 
including information regarding his interview with Mohawk’s coun-
sel.128  Mohawk resisted, claiming that this information was protected 
under the attorney-client privilege.129  The district court agreed but 
found that the privilege had been waived when Mohawk revealed cer-
tain information in the RICO litigation.130  Mohawk appealed to the 
Eleventh Circuit, which dismissed the appeal, holding that discovery 
orders relating to attorney-client privilege are not collateral orders 
subject to immediate appeal.131 
One interesting aspect of this case is the way different consti-
tuencies lined up before the Supreme Court.  The groups supporting 
immediate appealability were business interests and the American 
Bar Association.132  These groups argued that district court judges of-
ten decide privilege questions improperly and maintained that once 
privileged material is produced in discovery, the consequences can 
never be undone.133  Indeed, Mohawk’s attorney stated that waiting 
until final judgment to appeal the discovery order would, in effect, 
make the appeal unreviewable because there is “ ‘no way to un-
scramble the egg scrambled by the disclosure.’ ”134 
The opposing briefs included one from former federal judges 
and a group of law professors.135  This group argued that permitting 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 604. 
129 Id. 
130 Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 604. 
131 Id. 
132 See Brief for American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. 599 (No. 08-678), 2009 WL 1245114; Brief for The Voice of the 
Defense Bar as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. 599 (No. 08-
678), 2009 WL 1206221; Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of 
America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. 599 (No. 08-678), 
2009 WL 1263621. 
133 See Brief for American Bar Association, supra note 132, at 20 (maintaining that judges 
have profound differences of opinion on this subject and thus, “questions of waiver must be 
answered correctly if the privilege is to retain its vitality”). 
134 Brief for Petitioner at 25, Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. 599 (No. 08-678), 2009 WL 1155404 
(quoting In re Ford, 110 F.3d 954, 963 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
135 Former United States Court of Appeals Judge Kenneth Starr and Dean and Professor of 
Law Erwin Chemerinsky submitted an opposing brief.  See Brief for Former Article III 
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Court unanimously ruled against immediate appeals of adverse attor-
 
interlocutory appeals would undermine the ability of district court 
judges to control discovery and would also overwhelm already over-
burdened circuit courts.136  While then Solicitor General Kagan ar-
gued against immediate appeals of adverse attorney-client rulings, 
she took pains to distinguish certain governmental privileges, such as 
the presidential communications privilege and the state’s secrets pri-
vilege.137  These privileges, she asserted, are so fundamental to the 
operation of government as to require immediate appeal.138 
At oral argument, Mohawk’s attorney, Randall L. Allen, Esq., 
emphasized the importance of the attorney-client privilege, characte-
rizing it as a “central element of the administration of justice.”139  
This argument, however, was met with considerable skepticism from 
the Court.140  Justice Scalia said: “Mr. Allen, except for the fact that 
you and I are lawyers, do you really think that the . . . confidentiality 
right is any more important to the proper functioning of society than, 
let’s say, the protection of trade secrets[,]” such as a judge ordering 
the release of the formula for Coca-Cola?141  On the other hand, 
Chief Justice Roberts pointed to the brief submitted by the American 
Bar Association, which he characterized as a representation of “how 
the people affected . . . , the lawyers, view the value of the privilege 
and what will happen to it.”142  Professor Judith Resnick, arguing for 
Carpenter, replied by citing the brief submitted by lawyers, judges, 
and law professors.143  Chief Justice Roberts dismissively replied: 
“Oh, but . . . the law professors aren’t the ones who deal with this 
question on a day-to-day basis and have to worry about going to jail
144
Despite the disagreements reflected in the oral argument, the 
Judges and Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. 
599 (No. 08-678), 2009 WL 2040423. 
136 Id. at 3. 
137 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 7, Mohawk, 
130 S. Ct. 599 (No. 08-678), 2009 WL 2028902. 
138 See id. 
139 Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. 599 (No. 08-678), 2009 WL 
3169419. 
140 See id. at 3-4. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 38-39. 
143 Id. at 39 (stating that judges and law professors “are committed to understanding that 
the privilege is important instrumentally”). 
144 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 139, at 39. 
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ney-client privilege rulings.145  In its reasoning, the Court emphasized 
the importance of keeping the number of collateral rulings that are 
immediately appealable small.146  Justice Sotomayor stated that 
“[p]ermitting parties to undertake successive, piecemeal appeals of 
all adverse attorney-client rulings would unduly delay the resolution 
of district court litigation and needlessly burden the [c]ourts of 
[a]ppeals.”147  She acknowledged the importance of the attorney-
client privilege, but said the question does not turn on the importance 
of the interest in the abstract.148  Rather, “[t]he crucial question . . . is 
whether deferring review until final judgment so imperils the interest 
as to justify the cost of allowing immediate appeal of the entire class 
of relevant orders.”149 
Justice Sotomayor concluded that post-judgment appeals suf-
fice to assure the vitality of the attorney-client privilege.150  “Appel-
late courts can remedy the improper disclosure of privileged material 
in the same way they remedy a host of other erroneous evidentiary 
rulings: by vacating an adverse judgment and remanding for a new 
trial in which the protected material and its fruits are excluded from 
evidence.”151  Other ways of securing appellate review also exist: a 
party can seek a discretionary appeal, petition the court of appeals for 
a writ of mandamus, or the party can simply defy the disclosure order 
and be held in contempt, which, if characterized as criminal punish-
ment, would itself be directly appealable.152 
Although the New York Times dubbed Mohawk a minor deci-
sion,153 it is anything but minor as it relates to lawyering issues.  
Much has been written since the decision about the importance of 
thinking about the way in which internal investigations are con-
ducted, what communications between counsel and company em-
145 Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 609. 
146 Id. at 605-06. 
147 Id. at 608. 
148 Id. at 606. 
149 Id. 
150 Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 607-08. 
151 Id. at 606-07. 
152 Id. at 607-08.  This last option, incurring court-imposed sanctions by being held in 
contempt, prompted one critic of the decision to admonish lawyers litigating this issue to 
“carry a toothbrush” to court.  Editorial, Pack a Toothbrush, 198 N.J. L.J. 974 (Dec. 21, 
2009). 
153 Liptak, supra note 123, at A24 (noting that the only interesting aspect of Mohawk was 
Justice Sotomayor’s use of the term “undocumented immigrant”). 
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ployees will be privileged, and even when privileged, what will con-
stitute a waiver.154  One lawyer stated the decision could be viewed 
“as creating a new Miranda warning, but this time for . . . attorneys 
who conduct internal investigations and handle litigation: anything 
you write, say or learn in an interview could, and might, be revealed 
to your opposing counsel and be used against your client.”155  Any 
appeal of an adverse ruling on the privilege will have to await final 
judgment.156  But by then, can the toothpaste be squeezed back into 
the tube?  One litigation specialist suggested that the decision is like-
ly to lead to more settlements, at least where the information ordered 
disclosed amounts to something of a smoking gun.157  If, for exam-
ple, the information revealed that Carpenter was indeed fired for 
complaining about his employer hiring undocumented workers, the 
adverse ruling on the attorney-client privilege would likely motivate 
the employer to settle the case.
Three days after Mohawk was decided, the Ninth Circuit con-
sidered whether Mohawk should be extended to a First Amendment 
privilege ruling.  In Perry v. Schwarzenegger,159 the case challenging 
California’s Proposition 8 barring gay marriage, the court assumed 
“without deciding that discovery orders denying claims of First 
Amendment privilege are not reviewable under the collateral doc-
trine.”160  Instead, the court relied on mandamus jurisdiction to hear 
the case.  This decision serves as a reminder that there are many open 
questions about whether Mohawk will preclude collateral appeals of 
other discovery rulings. 
154 See, e.g., Checklists for Corporate Counsel, CKLCORPC § 10.1, Corporate internal 
investigations: A checklist for compliance (May 2010); Renee Newman Knake, The 
Supreme Court’s Increased Attention to the Law of Lawyering: Mere Coincidence or 
Something More?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1499 (2010). 
155 Marcia Coyle, Supreme Court Rejects Early Appeals of Attorney-Client Privilege 
Determinations, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 9, 2009, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp? 
id=1202436175573 (quoting Michael Lackey, Co-Chairman of Mayer Brown’s Electronic-
Discovery and Records-Management Practice). 
156 Id. 
157 Neal R. Troum, Mohawk Industries: A Pragmatic Decision, THE LEGAL 
INTELLIGENCER (Mar. 9, 2010), available at 2010 WLNR 4911378. 
158 Id. 
159 591 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2010). 
160 Id. at 1152, 1156. 
  
2011] LAWYERING DECISIONS 105 
 
B. Lewis v. City of Chicago 
In order to properly analyze Lewis v. City of Chicago,161 two 
earlier and extremely controversial cases must first be discussed: 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc.162 and Ricci v. DeSte-
fano.163 
In Ledbetter, the Court dismissed as untimely Lilly Ledbet-
ter’s claim that her employer violated Title VII164 by paying her sig-
nificantly less than its male employees.165  The Court held that her 
claim was untimely because it was not brought promptly after the 
employer initially made the discriminatory pay decision.166  The fact 
that Ledbetter had no conceivable way of knowing that she was being 
paid less than her male colleagues at the time did not seem to matter 
to the Court.167  The Court refused to treat each discriminatory pay-
check that she received as a present violation.168  Instead, the Court 
maintained that each paycheck was merely the result of a past act of 
discrimination.169  The Court said the current effects of prior discrim-
ination have “ ‘no present legal consequences.’ ”170 
The second case that requires referencing was the 2009, five-
to-four decision, Ricci.171  In Ricci, the Court ruled in favor of Cauca-
161 130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010). 
162 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. 
L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5, as recognized in Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 611 F. 
Supp. 2d 994 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
163 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). 
164 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (West 2010) 
(prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, gender, and 
national origin). 
165 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 621-22, 632. 
166 Id. at 632. 
167 See id. at 649-50 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the plaintiff was unable 
to know of the pay disparities at the time of the pay decision because of their concealment). 
168 Id. at 637 (majority opinion). 
169 Id. 
170 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 628 (quoting United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 
(1977)) (stating that “current effects alone cannot breathe life into prior, uncharged 
discrimination”).  This decision was highly controversial, so much so that it played a role in 
the 2008 presidential election.  Lilly Ledbetter appeared onstage at the Democratic National 
Convention and appeared at Obama’s side as he signed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Play Act of 
2009 into law.  See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Equal-Pay Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 30, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 1783967.  This Act legislatively overruled the 
Ledbetter decision and restored the paycheck accrual rule for pay discrimination claims.  See 
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009). 
171 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2663 (dissenting in this case were Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, 
Souter, and Breyer). 
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sian firefighters who sued the City of New Haven for discarding the 
results of a promotion exam because it had a disparate impact on mi-
nority firefighters.172  The Court held that before the employer may 
take such a step, “the employer must have a strong basis in evidence 
to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability.”173 
Lewis, one of last Term’s decisions, is another firefighter case 
involving the use of an exam.174  In 1995, the City of Chicago Fire 
Department used a written test to hire new firefighters.175  After ad-
ministering the exam to 26,000 applicants, the City announced that it 
would hire from those who fell into the “well-qualified range,” scor-
ing an eighty-nine or above, and it would not hire those who fell 
within the “unqualified” range, scoring below a sixty-five.176  Those 
who scored between sixty-five and eighty-eight were notified that 
they passed the exam and were qualified for the position, but based 
on projected hiring needs and the number of applicants who scored 
higher, it was likely they would not be hired.177  This practice re-
mained consistent through the next ten rounds of hiring, with the City 
hiring exclusively from the “well-qualified” category, which was dis-
proportionately white.178 
The policy was challenged by a certified class consisting of 
6,000 African Americans who scored in the “qualified” range but had 
not been hired.179  They claimed that the City’s practice of selecting 
only from applicants scoring an eighty-nine or above caused a dispa-
rate impact on African Americans.180  Just as in Ledbetter, the statute 
requires that a claim be filed with the Equal Employment Opportuni-
ty Commission (“EEOC”) within 300 days of the discriminatory 
act.181  The plaintiffs, however, did not challenge the adoption of the 
172 Id. at 2664. 
173 Id. at 2677. 
174 Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2195. 
175 Id. at 2195. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 2195-96. 
178 Id. at 2196.  On the eleventh round of hiring, the City had exhausted the “well-
qualified” category and began hiring those falling within the “qualified” category.  Lewis, 
130 S. Ct. at 2196.  However, the original plaintiff, an African-American in the “qualified 
category,” did not receive an offer during that, or any other, round of hiring and filed suit.  
Id. 
179 Id. 
180 Id.  The City of Chicago conceded the disparate impact, but argued that its policy was 
“justified by business necessity.”  Id. 
181 Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2196 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (West 2010)). 
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test nor the determination to hire only those who scored eighty-nine 
or above until well after 300 days of those acts.182  The question then 
became, “whether a plaintiff who does not file a timely charge chal-
lenging the adoption of a practice . . . may assert a disparate-impact 
claim in a timely charge challenging the employer’s later application 
of that practice.”183 
The plaintiffs won in district court, with the court finding “the 
cutoff score of eighty-nine [to be] statistically meaningless” and re-
jecting the City’s defense of business-necessity.184  The City stipu-
lated that the test results had a disparate impact on African Ameri-
cans.185  The district court also found that the City’s ongoing reliance 
on the test constituted a continuing violation, therefore allowing the 
plaintiffs’ claims to be timely.186  The Seventh Circuit reversed, find-
ing that the only discriminatory act was sorting the applicants into the 
categories marking the degrees of qualification.187  As a result, the 
court found that the plaintiffs had not filed their claim within 300 
days of the discriminatory act, as required by the statute.188  The cir-
cuit court maintained that the hiring decisions down the line were 
immaterial because they were essentially “the automatic consequence 
of the test scores rather than the product of a fresh act of discrimina-
tion.”189 
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded, finding the plaintiffs’ claim timely.190  The Court concluded 
that the failure to file a claim after the adoption of the discriminatory 
policy does not preclude new claims whenever the City implements 
the decision down the road.191  Furthermore, the Court distinguished 
Ledbetter, saying that Ledbetter does not stand for the proposition 
that present effects of prior actions cannot lead to Title VII liabili-
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 2195. 
184 Lewis v. City of Chicago, No. 98 C 5596, 2005 WL 693618, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 
2005) rev'd, 528 F.3d 488 (7th Cir. 2008) rev'd sub nom. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S. 
Ct. 2191 (2010). 
185 Id. at *8. 
186 Id. at *8 n.5. 
187 Lewis v. City of Chicago, 528 F.3d 488, 491, 494 (7th Cir. 2008) rev'd sub nom. Lewis 
v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010). 
188 Id. at 493. 
189 Id. at 491. 
190 See Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2197. 
191 Id. at 2199.  In light of Ledbetter, this is a bit surprising. 
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ty.192  Ledbetter “establish[es] only that a Title VII plaintiff must 
show a ‘present violation’ within the limitations period [and] [w]hat 
that requires depends on the claim asserted.”193  Because Ledbetter 
was a disparate treatment claim requiring proof of intentional dis-
crimination, in order to be timely, plaintiffs were required to establish 
“deliberate discrimination within the limitations period.”194  Howev-
er, the Court said that this reasoning does not apply to disparate im-
pact claims because such claims do not require proof of discriminato-
ry intent.195 
The Court recognized the practical difficulties created by its 
decision by acknowledging that employers can face disparate impact 
claims for practices that have been in use for years, with evidence as 
to whether the practice is justified as a business necessity potentially 
no longer available.196  However, not permitting the suit also produc-
es problematic results because an employer could adopt a discrimina-
tory policy, and if no one filed an immediate claim, the employer 
could then use that policy indefinitely with impunity, because no one 
would be able to challenge even a clearly discriminatory policy.197  
Or, equally problematic, a contrary ruling could result in plaintiffs fil-
ing “charges upon the announcement of a hiring practice, before they 
have any basis for believing it will produce a disparate impact.”198 
Ultimately, the Court concluded, it is not the task of the Court 
to decide which interpretation “produces the least mischief.”199  If 
Congress does not like the effects of the statute as written, it can cor-
rect the problem.200  Perhaps this was a veiled reference to the fact 
that Congress had indeed known how to undo the damage wrought by 
the Court in Ledbetter.201  Indeed, some commentators believe that 
192 Id. 
193 Id. (quoting Evans, 431 U.S. at 558). 
194 Id. 
195 Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2199. 
196 Id. at 2200 (referencing the briefs from “[t]he City and its amici warn[ing] that [the 





200 Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2200. 
201 A footnote in the decision bears on another important lawyering consideration. 
Remember, Lewis was brought as a class action.  Id. at 2196.  Footnote four points out that 
the petitioners asserted, and the City did not dispute, that the date of the earliest EEOC 
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the unanimity of the decision, as opposed to the five-to-four decisions 
in Ledbetter and Ricci, reflects the Court’s recognition of Congress 
lurking in the wings.202 
It is difficult to overstate the significance of this decision.  
Firstly, as to the local effects, Chicago’s firefighter applicant test is 
now pass-fail.203  About 112 of the African-American applicants will 
be hired, and estimates for the damages that Chicago will pay range 
from $45 million to $100 million.204  Secondly, the decision applies 
not just to public employers, but also to private employers, exposing 
them to more claims and larger rewards because disparate impact 
claims, unlike disparate treatment claims, typically involve larger 
classes of plaintiffs.  Thirdly, this decision was written by Justice 
Scalia, who also wrote a concurring opinion in Ricci just eleven 
months earlier.205  In his concurrence in Ricci, Justice Scalia ques-
tioned the very viability of disparate impact claims, raising the ques-
tion whether disparate impact claims violate the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.206  However, there is no hint 
of this question in the Lewis decision
Lewis will also have a profound impact on lawyers.  Attor-
neys will need to explain to their employer-clients how they can 
avoid liability under both Ricci and Lewis, since they seem to create 
something of a catch-22.  Ricci states that an employer can be sued 
for discarding the results of an exam that produces a disparate impact, 
whereas Lewis subjects the employer to liability for using that ex-
am.207  Timing seems to be key, with problems arising when employ-
charge filed by a named plaintiff controls the timeliness of the class’ claims.  Id. at 2197 n.4. 
As to that, the Court said, “We assume without deciding that this is correct.”  Id. 
202 See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, Unanimous Court Allows Firefighter Suit, NAT’L L.J., May 
25, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 10750605 (mentioning the close watch upon the Lewis 
decision because of previous actions Congress had taken after Ledbetter as a result of a 5-4 
decision). 
203 See David G. Savage, Firefighter Case to High Court, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 21, 2010, 
available at 2010 WLNR 3646336 (reporting that the new pass-fail test was adopted in 
2006). 
204 Cynthia Dizikes, Blacks in Fire Exam Hail Ruling, Applicants Didn’t Wait Too Long 
to Sue City, Jurists Say, CHI. TRIB., May 24, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 10744991. 
205 See Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2191; Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2681. 
206 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
207 Compare Ricci, 130 S. Ct. at 2701 (“As a result of today’s decision, an employer who 
discards a dubious selection process can anticipate costly disparate-treatment litigation . . . .), 
with Lewis, 129 S. Ct. at 2191. 
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ers revisit employment practices already in place.208  However, under 
Lewis, prudent employers must review practices adopted earlier to 
determine whether they create a disparate impact.209  Employers may 
find themselves negotiating something of a minefield. 
One headline announced, “U.S. Supreme Court Effectively 
Eliminates Statute of Limitations for Disparate Impact Cases.”210  
While this may be an exaggeration, the decision clearly means that 
employers can be sued for employment decisions made years earlier.  
Lawyers will need to counsel clients that all employment practices, 
both new practices and those that have been in place for years, must 
be carefully analyzed in order to consider whether the practice causes 
a disparate impact to a protected category, and if so, whether it can be 
justified as a business necessity.  And this applies not only to the use 
of employment examinations for hiring, but to all hiring, screening, 
and promotional practices.211  One employment law specialist ad-
vised that as employers assess their employment practices to deter-
mine whether they are producing a disparate impact, they need to be 
mindful that those assessments may not be protected from disclosure 
in subsequent litigation challenging the legality for those practices.212  
This case, together with Mohawk, means lawyers should advise 
clients to review employment selection processes in an attorney-
client privileged manner, being mindful that in doing so, they do not 
conduct themselves in a way that would amount to a waiver of that 
privilege. 
208 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2679. 
209 Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2200. 
210 Mr. Employment, Benefits and Labor Practice Group, U.S. Supreme Court Effectively 
Eliminates Statute of Limitations for Disparate-Impact Cases, MONDAQ, June 15, 2010, 
available at 2010 WLNR 12144709. 
211 For example, lawyers need to counsel employers that their use of social media to 
conduct background checks could potentially expose them to a disparate impact claim.  See 
U.S. Supreme Court Finds Disparate Impact Claims Timely Years After City Adopts Original 
Employment Practice, DORSEY & WHITNEY, LLP (June 10, 2010), 
http://www.dorsey.com/eu_laboremployment_socialmedia_060310.  Some argue that, 
“racial minorities, whose presence on social media is disproportionate to their numbers in the 
general population, will be more negatively impacted by [employers’] use of social media 
. . . in recruiting and hiring.”  Id. 
212 Dionysia Johnson-Massie, Supreme Court Gives Plaintiffs Multiple Opportunities 
(Potentially) to File Timely EEOC Charges Alleging Disparate Impact Discrimination, 
MONDAQ, June 11, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 11951119. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Collectively, these cases raise profound questions about la-
wyering.  The commentators were right—this was indeed the lawyer-
ing Term of the Supreme Court. 
